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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) was signed by
President Bush on July 26, 1990, a day heralded as "Liberation Day for
the Disabled."2 The legislation was designed to provide a clear and corn-
I Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-12213 and 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1990) [hereinafter ADA].
I Stephen Chapman, Waving a Magic Wand at the Needs of the Handicapped,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1989, § 4, at 3.
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prehensive national directive to end discrimination against individuals
with disabilities and to provide enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination on the basis of disability in private employment, public ac-
commodations, public services, transportation and telecommunications.3
Although the ADA arguably transforms the class of people with disabil-
ities from one of the least protected groups to the most protected minority
in our society, much of the legislation and the regulations are directed
towards discrimination based on physical handicaps and removal of phys-
ical barriers.4 The most significant obstacles which persons with either
physical or mental disabilities must face are not physical barriers, how-
ever, but are rather the attitudes and "stereotypic assumptions"6 held by
society at large.
This is particularly true of individuals with mental illness,6 which
constitutes probably the largest single group of disabled individuals,7 and
one of the least vocal. Because of negative social attitudes, individuals
with mild disorders hesitate to call attention to their condition, and "It]he
personal disorganization and defective social skills of the [more seriously
mentally ill] themselves preclude their forming an effective pressure
group in their own behalf.., while their social marginality and depend-
ency are likely to detract from whatever efforts they do make."8
3 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1989) [hereinafter S. REP.].
4 Titles II and III of the ADA deal with the provision of public transportation
by public entities and private entities, respectively. ADA §§ 221-310, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12141-190. Title III additionally prohibits discrimination and mandates the
removal or modification of physical and communication barriers in all places of
public accommodation and, in fact, contains certain affirmative action require-
ments in retro-fitting existing buildings. ADA §§ 301-310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-
90. Title IV provides that all common carriers of interstate or intrastate telephone
services must furnish telecommunication services which allow speech and hear-
ing-impaired individuals to communicate with hearing people. ADA § 401, 47
U.S.C. § 225.
" ADA § 2(a)(7), 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(7).
6 The class of mentally ill persons addressed in this note does not include those
with alcoholism or drug addiction. See generally Barry Trute, et al., Social Re-
jection of the Mentally Ill: A Replication Study of Public Attitude, 24 Soc. Psy-
CHIATRY PSYCHOL. EPIDEMIOLOGY, 69 (1989); Gary B. Melton & Ellen G. Garrison,
Fear, Prejudice and Neglect - Discrimination Against Mentally Disabled Persons,
42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1007 (1987).
7 One study indicates that in 1983 there were approximately 1.07 million Amer-
icans living outside of institutions who considered themselves disabled by mental
impairment. Howard H. Goldman & Ronald W. Manderscheid, Epidemiology of
Psychiatric Disability, in PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY 17 (Arthur Meyerson & Theo-
dora Fine eds., 1987), citing RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH (James
R. Greenley ed., 1983). According to 1984 figures, 827,000 chronically mentally
ill adults were receiving SSI or SSDI payments. Presumably these figures rep-
resent the most disabled of the mentally ill. Id.
8 SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER 327 (Andrew Scull ed., 1989). This lack of
advocacy on behalf of the mentally ill has turned around in recent years, however,
with the almost geometric growth of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
(NAMI), a group comprised of family members of individuals with mental illness
which began in 1979. BERTRAM BLACK, WORK AND MENTAL ILLNESS 227-28 (1988).
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In addition to limitations in speaking out for themselves,
limitations in participation in society often occur because of
the stigma attached to mental disorders. People qualified for
jobs are not hired because of a history of psychiatric hospital-
izations. Former mental patients are excluded from group liv-
ing, in certain neighborhoods, by zoning ordinances enacted to
keep them out ... [Individuals [with mental illness] system-
atically are placed at a disadvantage by their inability to par-
ticipate in society, whether in the work setting, the neighbor-
hood, or other settings.9
The issue of employment of the mentally ill has become increasingly
critical over the last decade as the general trend of deinstitutionalization
has resulted in greater numbers of individuals with mental illness being
maintained in the community, 10 while at the same time government ben-
efits have failed to keep pace with inflation." As one critic argues, the
market system of resource allocation in our society fails to meet the most
basic needs of housing, occupation and community for the mentally dis-
abled.12 "The crisis ... is simply the crisis of the normal social order in
relation to any of its members who lack the wage based ticket of entry
into its palace of commodities."'13 The purpose of this Note is to analyze
the potential impact the ADA will have on this problem of employment
discrimination against individuals disabled by mental illness.14
9 Cille Kennedy & Ernest M. Gruenberg, A Lexicology for the Consequences of
Mental Disorders, in PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY (Arthur Meyerson & Theodora Fine
eds., 1987).
"0 See generally ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM (1990); RAEL ISAAC &
VIRGINIA ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 1-16 (1990). The population labled
"young chronics" has also increased. "Young chronics" are patients ranging in
age from 18 to 35 who tend to be educated (over 90% are high school graduates
and an estimated 36-68% have attended college). The employment needs of this
population will be an important issue. BLACK, supra note 8 at 16.
" See generally Howard Goldman & Antoinette Gattozzi, Murder in the Ca-
thedral Revisited: President Reagan and the Mentally Disabled, 39 Hosp. & COMM.
PSYCHIATRY 505 (1988). See also CAROL WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT:
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 21-24 (1982). Warren maintains that the primary
motivating factor in the movement towards deinstitutionalization was fiscal -
primarily the desire to reduce funding for mental health treatment.
12 PETER SEDGWICK, PSYCHO POLITICS 239 (1982).
13 Id.
11 Although Title I and its prohibitions against discrimination by employers
in the private sector will have the most dramatic impact on individuals with
mental disability, the mentally impaired are equally protected by all provisions
of the Act. For example, § 204(c) specifically states that any public transit entity
must provide paratransit service for an individual with a disability who is unable,
as a result of a physical or mental impairment, to board, ride or disembark without
assistance. The phrase "mental impairment" was purposely included to ensure
eligibility of the mentally retarded and the mentally ill for such services. H.R.
REP- No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 [hereinafter H.R. REP. (I)].
1992]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1992
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
II. OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE I
The ADA is designed to complement and expand the protections pro-
vided by existing state and federal laws such as the Rehabilitation Act
of 197315 and the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988,'6 and incor-
porates the sanctions embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 For
example, the ADA extends employment rights to all employers with fif-
teen or more employees. The employment rights provided by Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are limited to employers or public ent-
ities which receive federal funds.' The rights provided by the ADA are
also a broad expansion of the rights available to the disabled under the
statutes of many states.'i The ADA provides that it shall not be construed
as affording a lesser level of protection than that provided by the Re-
habilitation Act20 nor does it preempt the "remedies, rights, and proce-
dures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of
any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the
rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act."
21
The general rule set forth in Title I of the ADA states that "no covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
15 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq. (1982 & Supp. V
1987). Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal legislation
to recognize employment rights of the disabled. Section 501 requires the federal
government as an employer to take affirmative action in the hiring and promotion
of handicapped individuals. Id. at § 791(b). Section 503 places a similar duty on
employers who are involved in contracts with the federal government over $2500.
Id. at § 793(a). Section 504, the most wide-reaching and heavily litigated provision
of the act, prohibits among other things discrimination against disabled individ-
uals solely on the basis of their handicaps in employment by or participation in
any programs receiving federal funds. Id. at § 794.
16 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
(1988). The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in sale or rental of housing, and provides that reasonable
accommodation in rules, policies, practices or services be provided if necessary to
afford the disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.
Id. at § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988). See generally Richard B. Simring, Note, The Impact
of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws on Housing for People with Mental Disabil-
ities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 413 (1991).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6, 2000e to e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See infra
notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
18 29 U.S.C. § 794. Very few actions have been brought against private em-
ployers under § 504. See generally Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act after Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 845.
19 See generally Ronald A. Lindsay, Discrimination Against the Disabled: The
Impact of the New Federal Legislation, 15 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L. J. 333, 335
(1989-90); TUCKER, supra note 18, at 923 n.6; and Note, From Wanderers to
Workers: A Survey of Federal and State Employment Rights of the Mentally Ill,
45 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 44-46 (1983) for a survey of state employment
rights.
20 ADA § 501(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
21 ADA § 501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.1 (b) and (c) (1991).
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procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.."22 Title I of the ADA extends the protections against
employment discrimination currently provided by the Rehabilitation Act
to all private employers with 25 or more employees two years following
the date of enactment, and to employers with 15 or more employees four
years after enactment.23 The Act is intended to ensure that individuals
with disabilities are not excluded from jobs unless they are unable in fact
to do the job.24 The House Labor Committee characterized the three major
provisions of Title I which ensure that an individual is considered ac-
cording to their actual ability to perform as:
Prohibiting disqualification of disabled applicants or em-
ployees because of their inability to perform marginal or non-
essential functions of the job;
Requiring employers who utilize requirements or selection
criteria which tend to exclude disabled individuals to demon-
strate that such criteria are job-related or a business necessity;
and
Requiring that employers make reasonable accommodation
to aid disabled individuals in meeting legitimate criteria.2 5
A. Prohibited Conduct in General
The ADA prohibits discrimination in virtually all aspects of employ-
ment, including "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. '26 "Other terms, con-
ditions and privileges of employment" include:
(a) Recruitment, advertising, and job application procedures;
(b) Hiring, upgrading, promotion, award of tenure, demotion,
transfer, layoff, termination, right of return from layoff, and
rehiring;
(c) Rates of pay or any other form of compensation and changes
in compensation;
(d) Job assignments, job classifications, organizational struc-
tures, position descriptions, lines of progression, and seniority
lists;
(e) Leaves of absence, sick leave, or any other leave;
(f) Fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether
or not administered by the covered entity;
22 ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
ADA § 101(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
24 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 31 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445 [hereinafter H.R. REP. (III)].
22 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 71 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303 [hereinafter H.R. REP. (II)].
26 ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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(g) Selection and financial support for training, including: ap-
prenticeships, professional meetings, conferences and other re-
lated activities, and selection for leaves of absence to pursue
training;
(h) Activities sponsored by a covered entity including social
and recreational programs;
27
Disabled employees cannot be limited to certain occupational tracks28 nor
can they be segregated in separate work or relaxation areas.29
The scope of prohibited conduct becomes apparent when the definition
of "discrimination" as used in Title I is considered. Discrimination en-
compasses:
Limiting, segregating, or classifying job applicants or employ-
ees in ways that adversely affect their opportunities because
of their disabilities;0
Participating in contracts or other arrangements or relation-
ships that have the effect of subjecting qualified applicants or
employees with disabilities to prohibited discrimination;
31
Using standards, criteria, or administration methods that have
the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability or that
perpetuate the discrimination of others subject to common ad-
ministrative control .32
Employers are further prohibited from excluding or otherwise denying
equal jobs or benefits to qualified individuals because they are known to
have a relationship or association with a disabled person. 33 For example,
an employer may not refuse to hire a person who has a disabled spouse
or child because of fears that the individual may miss work because of
the disabled relative. The employer is not required to make any accom-
modation for such an employee, however the non-disabled employee may
be disciplined or dismissed if they violate neutral tardiness or attendance
policies.
34
The Act additionally prohibits an employer from discriminating on the
basis of employee benefit plans. 35 An employer may not deny a qualified
individual employment because the employer's current insurance plan
does not cover the individual's disability or the disability of a family
member, or because of a desire to keep such an individual out of an
experience-rated health insurance plan.
3 6
27 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1991). See also S. REP. at 25.
28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 (1991)
- Id.
30 ADA § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
3. ADA § 102(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2). This provision includes relation-
ships with employment or referral agencies, labor unions, fringe benefit provider
organizations, and groups that provide training or apprenticeship programs; all
services provided by these entities to employees of the covered entity must be
accessible to disabled employees. H.R. REP. (III) at 37.
32 ADA § 102(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).
33 ADA § 102(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.8, app. § 1630.8 (1991) (citing S. REP. at 30, H.R. REP. (II)
at 61-62, H.R. REP. (III) at 38-39).
3 ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.8 (1991).
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B. Pre-Employment Inquiry and Testing
The ADA allows employers to make pre-employment inquiries con-
cerning an applicant's ability to perform essential functions37 of the job,
but the employer may not specifically ask if an individual has a disability
or what the nature or severity of any such disability might be. 38 This is
consistent with the regulations implementing section 50439 and is an
important protection for individuals with mental illness, since employers
have routinely requested such information from applicants, and often use
it to exclude individuals with disabilities before their capability of per-
forming the job is even considered. 40
In Doe v. Syracuse School District4' the plaintiff was excluded from a
job as a teacher's aide on the basis of a prior nervous breakdown when
he was serving in the Air Force, despite the fact that the school district's
doctors found him physically and mentally qualified for the position.
42
The employer claimed that by asking the plaintiff about prior mental
illness or prior treatment for mental illness, it was determining the plain-
tiff's present ability to perform the tasks of the position. The court stated
that the employer could have permissibly inquired whether the applicant
was capable of dealing with emotionally demanding situations; as the
inquiry was phrased, however, it violated the purpose of the regulation. 4"
An employer may also use physical and other job criteria or tests, but
such criteria or tests must be job-related and consistent with business
necessity if they screen out, or tend to screen out individuals with a
disability. 44 In addition to accurately reflecting job requirements, such
tests or criteria must accurately measure the applicant or employee's job
skills and aptitudes. 45 The test cannot reflect the impaired sensory, man-
,, For discussion of "essential functions," see infra notes 121-28 and accom-
panying text.
38 ADA §§ 102(d)(2)(A) and (B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A) and (B). Nor may
an employer provide a checklist of disabilities and ask the applicant to check off
any impairments he or she may have. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1991). An employer
may, however, make direct inquiries into the existence or nature of disabilities
if the employer is seeking to comply with an affirmative action requirement under
the Rehabilitation Act, provided that the employer makes clear that the infor-
mation is being used for such a purpose, that provision of the requested infor-
mation is totally voluntary, and that the information will be kept confidential.
S. REP. at 40.
39 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1989).
" H.R. REP. (II) at 72.
41508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). The plaintiff was specifically asked if he
had ever been treated for "migraine, neuralgia, nervous breakdown or psychiatric
treatment." Id. at 335.
42 Id. at 335-37.
43 Id. at 337.
"ADA § 102(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.7, 1630.10 (1991).
"Business necessity" has the same meaning as under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act: selection criteria which tend to discriminate but do not relate to an essential
function of the job are not consistent with business necessity. 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.10 (1991).
45 S. REP. at 38-39.
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ual or speaking skills of the disabled person, unless that skill is the factor
which the test purports to measure. 46
The ADA prohibits use of pre-employment medical exams or inquiries.47
The evaluation process allowed under the ADA parallels the process ex-
plained in the regulations implementing section 504 and assures that
misconceptions and prejudices do not bias the selection process before the
applicant's ability to do the job is assessed.48 As with tests and job criteria,
the only legitimate pre-employment inquiry is that relating to the ap-
plicant's ability to perform specific job-related functions. 49
An employer is allowed to require a medical examination after an offer
of employment has been made if the following conditions are met: all
entering employees, regardless of disability, must be required to submit
to such an exam, the information obtained from the exam must be treated
confidentially as required by the Act, and the results of the exam must
be used in accordance with Title 1.50 The offer of employment may be
conditioned upon the results of the post-offer examination if the position
has certain physical or psychological requirements which can only be
determined in such an exam.,' The limitations on the use of medical
examinations are not intended to prevail over any legitimate medical
requirements established by federal, state or local statutes.52
C. The Prima Facie Case and Burdens of Proof
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he suffers from a "disability"
that is protected by the Act;53 that he is a "qualified individual" for the
position in question;54 and that he has been discriminated against because
4r ADA § 102(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(7).
47 ADA § 102(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1).
41 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a), app. § 1630.13(a) (1991).
4! ADA § 102(d)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.13(a)
(1991).
o ADA § 102(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). The Act requires that information
obtained regarding the medical condition or history of the applicant be maintained
in separate files and treated confidentially, except that specific information may
be revealed to supervisors and managers, first aid and safety personnel, and
government officials investigating compliance with this Act. Id. See also infra
notes 228-30 and accompanying text. An employer may also conduct voluntary
medical examinations as part of an employee health program provided at the
worksite. ADA § 102(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(B).
11 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.14(b) (1991). If the exclusionary medical or psycholog-
ical criteria screen out or tend to screen out disabled applicants, the criteria must
be job related and consistent with business necessity, and there must be no rea-
sonable accommodation which would allow the disabled individual to satisfac-
torily perform the job. Id.
52 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., para. 10 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP.].
1 See infra section III.A.
14See infra section III.B.
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of his disability. 5 Although the concept of discrimination includes the
failure to "reasonably accommodate" the disabled individual, the duty to
reasonably accommodate terminates at the point that "undue hardship"
begins.
56
If a plaintiff establishes the existence of a covered disability and es-
tablishes that he is able to perform the essential functions of the position
despite the disability and without accommodation, the burden will then
shift to the employer to prove that the individual was not denied em-
ployment on the basis of the disability. If the plaintiff is not able to perform
the essential functions of the position without accommodation, then the
plaintiff must prove that a request for accommodation was made and that
with such accommodation he would be able to perform the essential func-
tions of the position. The employer must then prove either that reasonable
accommodation would not enable the plaintiff to satisfactorily perform,
or that provision of the reasonable accommodation would create an undue
hardship on the employer.
57
The employer clearly has the burden of proof on the issue of undue
hardship, but it is not clear who bears the burden on the issue of rea-
sonable accommodation.58 The legislative history states that reasonable
accommodation is generally triggered by a request from the disabled
individual,59 and the regulations confirm that it is generally the respon-
sibility of the disabled individual to inform the employer of the need for
an accommodation. 6 The employer has an affirmative obligation to pro-
vide a requested accommodation if it will enable the applicant or employee
to perform the essential functions of the position and will not create undue
hardship for the employer.6'
15 Compare the requirements to establish a prima facie case under the Reha-
bilitation Act: The "plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a 'handicapped individual'
under the Act, (2) that he is 'otherwise qualified' for the position sought, (3) that
he was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of his handicap, and
(4) that the program or activity in question receives federal financial assistance."
Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
56 See discussion of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship infra sec-
tions III.C and D.
17 See HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK
3-5, 59-61 (2nd ed. 1991). The EEOC announced in its overview of the regulations
issued for Title I that burden-of-proof issues would be addressed in further guid-
ance documents to be issued in the future. Equal Employment Opportunity for
Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,730 (1991).
5' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the allocation and order of
burden of proof in § 504 cases in Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir.
1981). "[A] § 504 action frequently does not lend itself easily to the analysis used
for allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof used in suits alleging
discrimination based on ... race ... [or] sex." Id. at 776. In the typical suit under
§ 504, the employer admits reliance on the plaintiffs handicap in making its
determination. The pivotal issue is therefore not whether the handicap was con-
sidered, but whether the consideration of the handicap in determining the indi-
vidual's qualification was discriminatory. Id.
19 H.R. REP. (II) at 65.
10 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1991).
61 ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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D. Disparate Impact and Intent
The ADA "incorporates a disparate impact standard to ensure that the
legislative mandate to end discrimination does not ring hollow. 6 2 "Dis-
parate impact" is defined, for purposes of Title I, as uniformly applied
criteria with "an adverse impact on an individual with a disability or a
disproportionately negative impact on a class of individuals with disa-
bilities.'63 The legislature adopted the standard set forth in Alexander v.
Choate64 in which the Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Act
could not be construed to prohibit only intentionally discriminatory con-
duct.65 The Alexander court refused, however, to interpret § 504 to reach
all action that had a disparate effect on the handicapped, holding that
this would create an "unwieldy administrative and adjudicative bur-
den."6
6
Although intent is not a necessary element under the ADA, it is un-
likely that an employer will be liable for actions not specifically prohibited
by the Act but which have a discriminatory impact of which the employer
is unaware. An employer will, however, rarely be unaware of the dis-
criminatory impact of his actions if the matter is properly raised under
the ADA, since, in order to show discrimination under the ADA, an em-
ployee must prove that a request for reasonable accommodation was made
and that the request was denied by the employer.
67
III. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF TITLE I AND MENTAL DISABILITY
Federal officials estimate that at least 15 million adults will experience
one or more of three types of severe mental illness - schizophrenia, manic-
depressive disorders or major depression - in their lifetime, while one in
four adults will suffer from one of a broader range of disorders, including
anxiety disorders and personality problems.68 To understand the breadth
of the class of individuals with mental illness who will be protected by
Title I of the ADA, it is necessary to study judicial interpretation of similar
concepts from section 504, particularly the terms "disability", "qualified
individual", "essential functions" (of the position) and "reasonable accom-
62 S. REP. at 30. See also ADA § 102(b)(2) and (3), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) and
(3).
6329 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(b) (1991).
"469 U.S. 287 (1985).
65 Id. at 296-97. Handicap discrimination is often a result "of thoughtlessness
and indifference - of benign neglect." Id. at 295.
6Id. at 298.
67 See discussion infra section III.D.
8Darrell A. Regier, M.D. et al., One-Month Prevalence of Mental Disorders in
the United States, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 977, 981 (1988).
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modation. ' ' 69 The scope of the protections under the ADA becomes more
clear in light of prior court decisions concerning these terms, because of
the similarity of the requirements under section 504. Under the ADA, as
under section 504, the "qualified individual" must be able to perform the
"essential functions" of the position "with or without reasonable accom-
modation.."70 Provision of reasonable accommodations is an affirmative
duty under the ADA as well as under section 504. Likewise, under the
ADA, if reasonable accommodation is requested, and such accommodation
will permit an employee to perform the essential functions of the job, the
employer is obligated to provide such accommodation or prove that to do
so would be an "undue hardship."71 The language of section 504 is thus
an essential starting point for interpretation of the impact of the ADA.
A. Psychiatric Illness as a Disability Under Title I
1. Definition of Disability Under the Act
"Disability," one of only three terms defined in the ADA for purposes
of the entire Act,72 is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; ... a
record of such an impairment; or ... being regarded as having such an
impairment."7 3 The Senate Labor Committee Report74 states that this
definition is to be interpreted consistently with the analysis of the defi-
nition of "individual with handicap" 75 in the implementing regulations
issued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,76 and by the regulations
implementing the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988. 77 Under the
69 Congress intended that the ADA regulations be comprehensive and clearly
stated. The EEOC utilized case law interpretation of § 504 to develop regulations
under the ADA which define terms not previously defined in the § 504 regulations,
including "substantially limits," "essential functions" and "reasonable accom-
modation." Equal Employment Opportunities for Individuals with Disabilities,
56 Fed. Reg. 35,727 (1991).
70 ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(8).
7' ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See infra discussion of undue
hardship, notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
72 ADA § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Other terms defined in this section include
"auxiliary aids and services" and "state." Id.
73 ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
1' S. REP. at 21.
71 "The use of the term 'disability' instead of'handicap'... represents an effort
by the Committee to make use of up to date, currently accepted terminology ....
Congress has been apprised of the fact that to many individuals with disabilities
the terminology applied to them is a very significant and sensitive issue." S. REP.
at 21. See also H.R. REP. (II) at 50-51.
76 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(1989). See also H.R. REP. (II) 50-54. See gen-
erally Annotation, Who is "Individual with Handicaps" under Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 USCS §§ 701 et seq), 97 A.L.R. FED. 40.
77 24 C.F.R. § 100.301 (1989).
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regulation issued by the EEOC, "mental impairment" includes "any men-
tal or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabili-
ties.17 8 "Major life activities" are defined as "functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."7 9 The substantial limitation of a major
life activity is made by comparing the individual's performance with that
achievable by the "average person in the general population."8' 0
Inclusion of "working" as a major life activity is an important provision
of the ADA for individuals suffering from a mental disability. The types
of problems which may be exhibited by the mentally ill and interfere
with their ability to work, including attendance problems, behavior anom-
alies, inability to get along with others, and difficulties in dealing with
stress, can be considered basic qualifications for the majority of employ-
ment situations,8' thereby substantially limiting the individual in the
major life activity of "working." In such cases it is important that the
employee's conduct not be viewed separately from his disabling condition,
if the behavior is in reality a symptom of the condition.
8 2
2. Psychiatric Illness as a Disability Generally
Mental illness, unlike physical disabilities which generally produce
well-defined symptoms and effects, often manifests itself in vague and
ill-defined ways, which make the determination of a disability trouble-
some .83 Courts have acknowledged the difficulties in assessing psychiatric
78 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1991).
'9 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2j) (1991). "The term 'average person' is not intended to
imply a precise mathematical 'average'." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1991). The
determination of substantial limitation must be made "without regard to miti-
gating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." Id. See
generally James M. Zappa, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
Improving Judicial Determinations of Whether an Individual is "Substantially
Limited", 75 MINN- L. REV. 1303 (1991).
81 In one study of a group of de-institutionalized psychiatric patients, the work
performance of those who were employed was plagued by absenteeism, tardiness,
low productivity and lack of motivation. SUE E. ESTROFF, MAKING IT CRAZY 2147
(1981). But see BLACK, supra note 8, at 15 (citing a study comparing two off-track
betting parlors, one of which employed patients at a state psychiatric center. The
study found "no difference in work performance, absence, tardiness, human re-
lations, objectivity (relationship to supervisor), appearance, personality, or overall
employee's rating" between the psychiatric patients and the employees at the
identical center).
A study of employed persons with mental illness receiving treatment at a VA
hospital found that employees who suffered from schizophrenia or anxiety dis-
orders often had disturbed interpersonal relationships and functioned better when
they were able to work with little direct personal interaction with other employ-
ees. Teresita Bacani-Oropilla, et al., Patients With Mental Disorders Who Work,
84 S. MED. J. 323, 325-26 (1991).
82 See David A. Larson, Mental Impairments and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
48 LA. L. REV. 841, 870 (1988). See generally Zappa, supra note 81.
1 See generally Walter Neff, Vocational Rehabilitation in Perspective, in Vo-
CATIONAL REHABILITATION OF PERSONS WITH PROLONGED PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
5, 6-7 (Jean A. Ciardiello and Morris D. Bell eds., 1988).
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evidence and testimony,8 4 which is largely based on subjective, non-phys-
ical data. The court's opinion in Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Commission5 illustrates this difficulty:
This is not a case involving whether an employee is able to
screw nuts and bolts onto a widget with sufficient speed. No
such cut-and-dried factual proof is available when dealing with
the "soft science" surrounding the health or affliction of an
individual's psyche.8A
Another problem encountered by courts in these cases is the challenge
of distinguishing between conduct which is a result of the mental disa-
bility and generally unacceptable behavior.8 7 The regulations point out
the importance of distinguishing between "common personality traits
such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms
of a mental or physical disorder."88
Although neither the ADA nor the regulations implementing Title I
contain a list of impairments which qualify as disabilities, 8 numerous
mental impairments have been found by courts to qualify as handicaps
under section 504, most of which will qualify under the ADA as well.8 0
These include manic-depressive disorder, 98 schizophrenia, 92 personality
disorder,93 anxiety disorder,94 alcoholism, 95 post traumatic stress disor-
4 See also JAY ZISKIN & DAVID FAUST, 1 COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 171 (4th ed., 1988) ("in light of current scientific evidence,
there is no reason to consider [psychiatric and psychological expert] testimony
as other than highly speculative").
85 704 F.2d 1402, reh'g denied, 709 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 1410. The court further notes that absolute deference to the psychiatric
expert is not required, nor are they suggesting rubber stamp approval. "A sound,
thorough record substantiating the expert's decision must be developed." Id. at
1410 n.8.
- See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
"1 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1991). See, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2nd
Cir. 1989) (significant personality traits which made plaintiff unsuitable for police
work did not amount to an impairment under the Rehabilitation Act).
9 H.R. REP, (II) at 51 (it would be impossible to develop a comprehensive list
of conditions that qualify as disabilities, especially since new disorders may de-
velop in the future).
I See section III.A.2 infra for psychiatric conditions specifically excluded from
coverage under the ADA.
" Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985); Matzo v. Postmaster Gen.,
685 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1987); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985)
(plaintiff was disabled due to both coronary artery disease and mental impair-
ment).
92 Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); Franklin v. United States Postal
Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Swarm v. Walters, 620 F. Supp. 741
(D.D.C. 1984) (paranoid schizophrenia.)
91 Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (borderline personality dis-
order); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988) (borderline personality
disorder with obsessive-compulsive features); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp.
511 (D.D.C. 1983) (schizoid personality disorder).
94 Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989).
91 Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Guerriero v.
Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983).
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der,96 depression,97 and unspecified psychiatric problems. 98
For many clinicians, once a psychiatric diagnosis is established for a
patient, the patient's disability is proven. In several cases brought under
§ 504, the courts have apparently accepted the existence of a psychiatric
diagnosis alone as adequate to establish a handicap. 99 It appears from
the definition of mental impairment and from the appendix to the reg-
ulations that a psychiatric diagnosis is a prerequisite to a finding of a
disability of mental illness; 00 however, psychiatric diagnosis alone should
not be considered conclusive evidence of disability. Such an approach
would be, in the first instance, over-inclusive since it is estimated that
more than 20% of the population suffers from some diagnosable psychi-
atric disorder. " The system of assessment and diagnosis of mental illness,
moreover, is far from exact. Clinicians utilize the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-Il-R),'0 2 a system that one critic
warns "is indeed hazardous to predicate judgments in legal matters upon
diagnoses that arise out of what continues to be an inadequately re-
searched and validated diagnostic system that is still in its early, devel-
opmental stages."'10 3 Furthermore, the purpose of a finding of disability
under the ADA and the purpose of a DSM diagnosis are not always
consistent.
Courts have not always equated a psychiatric diagnosis with disability.
In Forrisi v. Bowen,10 4 for example, the plaintiff was diagnosed with ac-
rophobia (fear of heights) which, although it had never before interfered
with any major life activities, prevented him from performing his duties
as a utility systems repairer. The Forrisi court, finding that his acrophobia
was not a handicap for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act because it only
prevented him from a small category of occupations, held that the task
of determining who is handicapped under the Act must be an individu-
alized inquiry of whether the impairment creates a significant barrier to
96 Schmidt v. Bell, 233 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
97 Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 772 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (employee's major
depressive episode was a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act).
98 Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402,
reh'g denied, 709 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1983) (phobia of air travel, repeated suicidal
episodes); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W.V. 1976).
99 See, e.g., Blackwell v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 639 F. Supp. 289, 290
(D.D.C. 1986) (transvestitism is recognized by APA as a mental disorder, plaintiff
is a handicapped person under the Rehabilitation Act); Guerriero, 557 F. Supp.
at 513 ("The evidence ... establishes prima facie that plaintiff has a schizoid
personality disorder and is an alcoholic; ... either or both conditions can be
regarded as handicapping conditions under the Act").
0 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1991). "[T]he definition [of mental impairment]
does not include common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick
temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or physical disorder." Id.
"I See, Larson, supra note 82, at 855-59; BLACK, supra note 8, at 9. In addition,
the ADA specifically excludes some psychiatric diagnoses as disabilities. See infra
section IV.B.
1
02 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. revised
American Psychiatric Ass'n 1987).103 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 84.
104 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
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employment. 1 5 If the impairment excludes the individual from only the
particular job in question, but not from employment in general, the im-
pairment is not significant enough to be a substantial limitation of a
major life activity.10 6 The court must consider not only the number and
type of jobs which the individual is excluded from, but also the geograph-
ical area which is reasonably accessible to the individual, and the indi-
vidual's background, education and job expectations. 107
3. Psychiatric Impairments Excluded Under Title I
Several mental impairments, some of which were protected under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, are specifically excluded from coverage under
the ADA. 10 8 These include all sexual behavior disorders, including
transvestism, 1" 9 transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
and gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments. 10
Compulsive gambling,"' kleptomania," 2 pyromania and psychoactive
substance use disorders resulting from current use of illegal drugs are
also excluded from coverage." 3 Illegal drug users who are currently en-
10, Id. at 933.
106 Id. at 933-34. See also Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244,
1248 (6th Cir. 1985) (an impairment interfering with only one job or a narrow
range of jobs is not substantially limiting); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980) (factors to be considered are the number and types of
jobs for which the individual is disqualified by the disability, and the geographical
area accessible to the disabled individual).
101 Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101.
"08 The Act expressly states that homosexuality and bisexuality, which were
not covered handicaps under prior federal law, are not impairments and therefore
are not disabilities under the Act. ADA § 511(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a). See also
H.R. REP. (III) 31. But see, H.R. REP. (IV) at 81-83 (dissenting views of Reps.
Dannemeyer, Barton and Ritter). Failure to exclude AIDS or asymptomatic HIV
infection as disabilities under the act make the ADA "a homosexual rights bill
in disguise." Id. at 82. "It does not require a particularly shrewd attorney to argue
that the protections available in the ADA are available to all male homosexuals
by virtue of the perception that homosexual males 'are regarded as' being infected
with HIV." Id.
-0- ADA § 508, 42 U.S.C. § 12208. This is a departure from the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, under which transvestism was held to be a handicapping impairment
in Blackwell v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1986).
ADA § 511(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1).
'"Compulsive gambling was judicially held to be a handicap under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 in Rezza v. United States Dept. of Justice, 698 F. Supp.
586 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
112 Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988) (Behavioral disorder with
associated kleptomania was determined to be a handicap by the EEOC. The
district court expressly did not decide if this constituted a handicap because even
if the plaintiff were handicapped, he would not be otherwise qualified).
113 ADA § 508(b)(2) and (3), 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) and (3). The dissenting
views of Dannemeyer, Barton & Ritter, supra note 108, argue that the exclusions
should have included all other behavior disorders. Failure to exclude other be-
havior disorders qualifies "[dlozens, and perhaps hundreds, of behavioral disor-
ders" for protection as disabilities under the ADA. H.R. REP. (IV) at 81.
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gaged in the use of such substances are also specifically excluded from
coverage under the ADA."
4
B. Who is a Qualified Individual Under Title I
After the determination is made that a plaintiff has a disability covered
by the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he is qualified for the position
in question. The definition of "qualified individual with a disability,"
which is specific to Title I of the ADA, is "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that the individual holds or
desires. 111 This definition is expanded in the regulations to an individual
"who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-
related requirements of the ... position"" 6 and should be interpreted in
the same manner as "otherwise qualified" ' 17 has been construed for the
purposes of § 504.118 The individual must meet the qualification standards
established by the employer for the position."' The definition is intended
to prevent an employer from excluding an applicant or employee because
of the inability to perform marginal job functions, rather than concen-
trating on the essential duties involved in the job.120
1. Essential Functions of Position
A qualified individual with a disability must be able to perform the
"essential functions" of a position. "Essential functions" is defined by the
EEOC in the regulations as "the fundamental job duties of the employ-
ment position.' 121 Title I states that consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or inter-
viewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evi-
dence of the essential functions of the job.122 The criteria or tests which
114ADA § 510, 42 U.S.C. § 12210. The ADA further amends section 7(8) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 706(8)) to exclude current drug users from
the definition of individuals with handicaps. ADA § 512, 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
1 5 ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
116 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1991).
1
7 For a discussion of the meaning of "otherwise qualified" under the Reha-
bilitation Act, see Annotation, Who is "Qualified" Handicapped Person Protected
from Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USCS
§§ 701 et seq.) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 80 A.L.R. FED. 830.
11 S. REP. at 26.
"9 "Qualification standards" include personal and professional requirements
of the position, such as educational requirements, experience, possession of req-
uisite skills, and physical, medical and safety requirements which the employer
requires for eligibility for the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (1991).
120 H.R. REP. (II) at 55, H.R. REP. (III) at 33.
121 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1991).
M ADA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). An amendment which would have
created a legal presumption from such a written job description and thereby
shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff was rejected by the House. H.R. REP.
(III) at 33-34.
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an employer uses to determine qualification for essential functions are
valid only if they are "job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity."'' 23 Furthermore, the term "essential function" encompasses only the
function, not the manner in which it is performed.1
24
Although the essential functions of some jobs are self evident (for ex-
ample, the ability to drive is an essential function for a position as a
chauffeur), in many positions the determination is not clear. 125 Aside from
the discussion in the ADA legislative history noted above, 26 there is little
available interpretation of the definition of essential functions. The reg-
ulations under section 504 do not define the phrase, and it has infre-
quently been directly addressed by the courts. 127 The regulations under
the ADA state that a function may be considered essential if the position
exists specifically to perform the function or the employee was hired
specifically for his or her expertise in performing the function, or if there
are a limited number of employees able to perform the function. 12
In Wimbley v. Bolger,129 the employee, disabled due to diabetes and
mental illness, was terminated because he failed to come to work. The
Wimbley court made the obvious determination that "one who does not
come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or oth-
erwise."' 30 Wimbley illustrates the problem of deciding whether conduct
which is a symptom of the disability prevents the individual from per-
forming the essential functions.13t
123 H.R. REP. (II) at 56. See Bentivegna v. Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.
1982) (business necessity must not be confused with mere expediency).
124 H.R. REP. (III) at 33 (the essential function involved in use of a computer
is entry and retrieval of information, not ability to use a traditional keyboard or
screen).
12I See Tucker, supra note 18, at 902-04.
126 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988)
(70 pound lifting requirement for a clerk's job was questionable as an essential
function when the plaintiff testified that she had never seen any clerk do any
heavy lifting); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983) (amount of
time devoted to a particular function is one factor, but not the only consideration
in determining whether the function is essential: it must also be determined
whether other employees are able to perform the functions that the disabled
employee is unable to perform).
128 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1991). Whether a function is essential is a factual
determination, and evidence which should be considered includes the employer's
judgment as to what is essential, a written job description, the amount of time
spent performing the particular function, consequences to the employer of not
requiring the employee to perform the function, the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the work experience of past or present employees in
similar jobs. Id.
121 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
12 Id. at 485. See also Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (employee's inability to present himself at work in any predictable, constant
and scheduled manner due to intermittent eye inflammation not a handicap under
§ 501 the court would be forced to find every illness which prevented regular
work attendance to be a handicap); Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C.
1988) (employee's pattern of unscheduled absences over a two year period caused
her to lose her status as a "qualified handicapped employee").
131 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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2. Need for Individualized Determination
Although the employers' judgment concerning the essential functions
of a job will be given some deference, the determination of whether a
mentally ill individual is qualified to carry out the essential functions of
the position requires a detailed analysis of both the job tasks and the
nature and extent of the individual's impairment. 132 In School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 3 3 the Supreme Court concluded that in most
cases, a determination of whether an individual is otherwise qualified
will require an individualized inquiry and issuance of appropriate find-
ings of fact on the part of the court.134 The purpose of this detailed in-
vestigation is to ensure that the employee is not rejected on the basis of
prejudice or unfounded fears and at the same time ensure that the le-
gitimate concerns of the employer are not ignored.135 Furthermore, "li]n
reality, attitudes toward impaired persons vary with the type and severity
of impairments, and any one impairment affects productivity differently
in different jobs."136 The diversity among impairments suggests that gen-
eralizations are not possible and that an individualized determination
which looks at both the employee's current condition and past history,
and the general requirements and hazards of the job is necessary.' 37
3. Determination Must be Based on Present Qualifications
The determination of an individual's qualification for a position must
be based on the individual's abilities at the time of the employment
132 S. REP. at 27. The EEOC reiterates this position in the appendix to the
regulations. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1620.2(m) and (n).
133480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
1- Id. at 287. It is important to note that, although critics contend that the
subjectivity of the definitions in the ADA and the need for individualized deter-
minations will lead to extensive litigation, see, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 20, at
333-34; Letter to the editor by John Sloan, Jr., What's Wrong with the New Civil
Rights Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1989, at A23; Glen Elsasser, Senate OK's Rights
Bill for Disabled, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1989, § 1, at 1, the characteristic of being
disabled is not a static characteristic as is race or sex, and therefore mandates
such an individualized determination.
135 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287. Although Arline dealt with an individual who
suffered from a contagious disease, the case is a good analogy to mental illness
since ignorance, incorrect assumptions and unfounded fears are common in both
situations.
136 William G. Johnson, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination against
Handicapped Workers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease?, in DISABILITY AND THE
LABOR MARKET 242 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 1986).
137 One author sets forth detailed guidelines for psychologists making deter-
minations of "fitness-for-duty" of individuals with mental illness under the Re-
habilitation Act and the ADA, which include "degree of disability; current
condition; past medical and work histories; nature of the position in question;
and nature, duration, immediacy, probability and severity of risk involved." Pa-
tricia Maffeo, Making Non-Discriminatory Fitness-for-Duty Decisions About Per-
sons with Disabilities Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 309 (1990).
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action,138 and cannot rest on the employer's projections that the individual
will become unable to perform and thus unqualified in the future, nor on
the employer's concern about what is "best" for the disabled person."39
The risk of danger to the health or safety of others or to property is an
exception to the "presently qualified" requirement, however, and is a
legitimate basis for determining that an individual is not qualified.
140
C. Reasonable Accommodation
Although the ADA sets forth a non-exhaustive list of reasonable ac-
commodations, the term "reasonable accommodation" is not defined in
the Act.14 1 This list of reasonable accommodations includes altering ex-
isting facilities to make them accessible to disabled employees, 142 job
restructuring, job reassignment, modification of work schedules, acqui-
sition of equipment, modification of existing equipment or devices, pro-
viding readers or interpreters, and altering examinations, training
materials or policies. 143 The regulations define reasonable accommodation
as:
Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that
enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered
for the position such qualified applicant desires; or modifica-
tions or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner
or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with
a disability to perform the essential functions of that position;
or modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privi-
leges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly sit-
uated employees without disabilities.
4 4
The duty to make reasonable accommodation applies to all employment
decisions, and the determination of whether a reasonable accommodation
is appropriate is an individualized fact-specific determination.
145
131129 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (1991).
139 H.R. REP. (i1) at 34.
140 See infra notes 179, 183-92 and accompanying text discussing direct threat
as employer defense.
41 ADA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The list "is intended to provide general
guidance about the nature of the obligation.., and is not meant to suggest that
employers must follow all of the actions listed in each particular case." H.R. REP.
(II) at 62.
-42 ADA § 101(9)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A).
143 ADA § 101(9)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Several of the examples of ac-
commodation listed in the ADA are not included in the comparable § 504 regu-
lations. Those not previously included are reassignment to a vacant position, and
modification of examinations, training materials and policies.
144 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1991).
145 H.R. REP. (II) at 61.
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The regulations state that in order Nto determine the appro-
priate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the
covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with
the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accom-
modation. This process should identify the precise limitations
resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accom-
modations that could overcome those limitations. 14 6
The House Labor Committee report explains in detail employer obliga-
tions in regard to reasonable accommodation. 147 The employer must notify
all applicants and employees of its obligation under the ADA to make
such reasonable accommodations. 148 The duty to accommodate is gener-
ally triggered by a request from the disabled individual; if an applicant
has an obvious disability which he has not identified it is not clear if the
employer can raise the subject of reasonable accommodation. 149 In the
absence of a request for accommodation, it would be inappropriate to
provide any accommodation, especially where it would impact adversely
on the individual.150 An accommodation need not be provided if the in-
dividual is not otherwise qualified or if the accommodation will not enable
the individual to perform the essential functions of the job.' 5'
Although many of the accommodations listed in the Act are directed
towards individuals with physical disabilities, courts have identified job
restructuring and reassignment as reasonable methods of accommodating
employees with mental illness. 5 2 Job restructuring may include elimi-
nation of non-essential functions of the job, modification of procedures,
14629 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1991).
147 H.R. REP. (II) at 64-65. The House Labor Committee report continues by
listing four informal steps which should be followed in order to identify and
provide appropriate accommodations. Id. at 66-67. The recommended steps are:
1. Identify barriers by first distinguishing essential and non-essential
functions of the job, and then identifying the abilities and limitations of
the individual with the disability. The employer can then recognize whichjob tasks or aspects of the work environment prevent performance.
2. The employer must then identify possible accommodations - first con-
sulting with the disabled individual, then with any available state agencies
who can offer guidance.
3. The reasonableness of the possible accommodations must be assessed
in terms of effectiveness and equal opportunity. The accommodation should
provide a meaningful equal employment opportunity.
4. The final step is implementation of the most appropriate accommo-
dation.
Id. See also the discussion of reasonable accommodation at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9
(1991).
'1' ADA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 12115.
149 H.R. REP. (II) at 65.
50 Id.
"I H.R. REP. (II) at 64.
"'2 The largest study done on accommodations made for disabled employees by
federal contractors under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 found that the
following accommodations were most commonly made for employees with mental
or emotional disabilities:
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delegation of particular assignments or duties to another employee, or
exchange of assignments with another employee.' Courts have held that,
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an employer need not accommodate
an employee by eliminating one of the essential functions of the job.1 54
However modification of job requirements such as eliminating contact
with the public, providing a low stress work environment, eliminating
distractions, or modifying schedules to allow time off for therapy are all
examples of job restructuring which could be utilized as appropriate ac-
commodations for an employee with a mental disability 155 Costs for these
types of accommodations may be difficult to assess, but are likely to be
minimal.156
An employee may also be accommodated by reassignment to a vacant
position if the employee can no longer perform the essential functions of
his current job, although the employer should first try to accommodate
the employee in the position he was hired to fill. 157 Reassignment is not
available as an accommodation for applicants, and reassignment may not
be made to a lower graded position unless there are no accommodations
available to enable the employee to remain in the current position and
Oriented co-workers, supervisors - 47.4%
Reassigned tasks - 22.8%
Transferred to another job - 21.1%
Modified work hours - 15.8%
Other modification of work procedure - 15.8%
Additional training - 14.0%
Frederick C. Collignon, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in Employing
Disabled Persons in Private Industry, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 223
(Monroe Berkowitz and M. Anne Hill eds., 1986).
113 H.R. REP. (II) at 62.
114 See, e.g., Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir.
1988); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985).
11- Accommodations for the mentally disabled "might be as minor and inex-
pensive as providing more frequent breaks or quieter work areas." Milt Freu-
denheim, New Law to Bring Wider Job Rights for Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
23, 1991, at Al. See also Laura L. Mancuso, Reasonable Accommodation for
Workers With Psychiatric Disabilities, 14 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J., October 1990,
at 3 (thorough analysis of reasonable accommodations for persons with mental
illness).
15, Collignon, supra note 152, at 226-27. Fifty percent of accommodations made
for individuals with mental or emotional disability were at no cost, another
twenty-nine percent were made at a cost of $499 or less.
117 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1991). Reassignment has been one of the most
frequently argued desirable accommodations for individuals with mental disa-
bilities in Rehabilitation Act cases. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.
1989); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988); Wimbley v. Bolger, 642
F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985);
Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 39 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Courts have
generally held that the Rehabilitation Act does not obligate an employer to reas-
sign an employee. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19,
reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (D.
Md. 1985) (court concluded upon examination of the applicable regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 1613.704, that the duty of the Postal Service to reasonably accommodate
applied only to the employee's current position and did not require reassignment
or transfer to another position).
1992]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1992
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
there are no equivalent positions available. 58 Use of reassignment as an
accommodation may be significantly limited, however, by the existence
of a collective bargaining agreement.159 If the ADA is to be interpreted
consistently with the manner in which Rehabilitation Act regulations
have already been interpreted, reassignment in violation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement will be prohibited unless the agreement
itself has the effect or intent of discrimination.160
D. Employer Defenses
1. Undue Hardship
Proof of "undue hardship" relieves an employer from the obligation to
provide accommodation under the ADA. 161 The ADA does not precisely
define undue hardship; rather it states generally that undue hardship
"means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when con-
sidered in the light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B)."'1 62 The
factors to be considered in determining if an accommodation amounts to
undue hardship are:
a. the size and overall financial resources of both the individual
facility and the covered entity,
b. the type of operation of the business, and
c. the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.' 63
The House Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment which would
have set a cap on the cost of reasonable accommodation at ten per cent
(10%) of the employee's salary as a per se undue hardship 64 and adopted
1'l 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1991).
119 An employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to accomplish
what it could not otherwise do under the ADA. H.R. REP. (I1) at 63. See also S.
REP. at 32. The Senate states that the collective bargaining agreement could be
relevant in determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. It also
recommends that collective bargaining agreements contain a clause allowing an
employer to take whatever actions are necessary to comply with the ADA. Id.
The House Labor report states that the collective bargaining agreement "would
not be determinative on the issue." H.R. REP. (II) at 63.
160 Case law under § 504 has almost always upheld violation of a collective
bargaining agreement as a defense against reasonable accommodation. See, e.g.,
Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (lst Cir. 1989) (employee suffering from an
anxiety disorder need not be accommodated by employer under § 504 by reas-
signment to a position in violation of an existing collective bargaining agreement);
Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1987) (duty to accommodate "would
not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be
shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination").
161 ADA § 102(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
162 ADA § 101(10)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
'- ADA § 101(10)(B)(i-iv), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i-iv). See generally Julie
Bradfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 113 (1990).
1' H.R. REP. (III) at 41. Compare Russell A. Janis, A Unified Theory for Section
504 Employment Discrimination Analysis: Equivalent Cost-Base Standards for
"Otherwise Qualified" and "Reasonable Accommodation", 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
63, 72-73 (1986) (Janis proposes a cost-based analysis for determining the exis-
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the "flexible approach" utilized in the regulations implementing §§ 501
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 65
The Judiciary Committee cites favorably'6 6 the approach of the district
court in Nelson v. Thornburgh167 which held that, despite the substantial
costs of providing materials for blind employees, the costs represented
only a small fraction of the employer agency's budget and therefore did
not constitute an undue hardship. The court, however, noted that the
same accommodations may constitute an undue hardship for a smaller
employer. The concept of undue hardship is further explained in the
legislative history as requiring more than the de minimis approach used
by the Court in TWA v. Hardison168 and as a much higher standard than
the "readily achievable" standard applied to the duty to remove physical
barriers in existing buildings in Title III of the ADA. 169
Availability of other resources to pay for an accommodation must also
be considered. An employer may not use the defense of undue hardship
if an employee is willing to pay for the necessary accommodation or if an
agency such as a state vocational rehabilitation agency is willing to fund
all or part of the accommodation. 170 The employer must pay for the portion
tence of discrimination under § 504); Comment, Employment Discrimination
Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on
Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1014-15 (1984) (The author suggests a
percentage of salary cap for reasonable accommodation: "By calculating the max-
imum level of required accommodations in terms of percentage of salary, the
proposed [method] would provide usable standards for decision makers and un-
derstandable guidelines for employers and handicapped employees."); Steven F.
Stuhlbarg, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
1311, 1342 (1991) (proposing a mathematical formula for determining undue
hardship).
165 See H.R. REP. (III) at 40. See also S. REP. at 36. But see Comment, supra
note 164, at 1011. The author argues that this flexible approach is unworkable
since the definition of undue hardship and the factors to be considered in the
§ 504 regulations fail to specify how such factors are to be weighted and assessed,
or how much hardship is "undue." "Rather than provide a clear criterion for
decision by designating some limit on the burden that may be imposed on em-
ployers, 'undue hardship' seems in practice to have served simply as a label for
accommodations that courts have refused to require in particular cases." Id.
166 H.R. REP. (III) at 41.
161567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
,68 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (requiring employer to bear more than de minimis cost
to accommodate the employee's religion would be an undue hardship).
16M ADA § 301(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). "Readily achievable" means "easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense."
H.R. REP. (III) at 40.
17o 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1991). The employer should also take into con-
sideration tax credits available. Id. For example, § 190 of the Internal Revenue
Code currently allows tax deductions of up to $15,000 (reduced from $35,000 for
tax years after 1990) for the costs of removing architectural barriers. I.R.C. § 190
(CCH 1990). The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990) creates a disabled "access" tax credit of up to $5,125 for small
businesses for removal of architectural barriers and for provision of readers,
interpreters and equipment for hearing or sight impaired employees. Id. at §
11611. This Act also extends for one year, until December 31, 1991, the targeted
jobs credit for disabled workers, which gives a tax credit of up to $6,000 for forty
percent of the employee's wages. Id. at § 11405.
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of the accommodation which would not otherwise amount to undue hard-
ship.17 1 The regulations make it clear that an employer has an affirmative
obligation to seek outside funding for an accommodation, and that only
the portion of the cost of the accommodation which cannot be recovered
can be considered when making a determination of undue hardship.
172 It
is not clear, however, what would happen if a disabled employee is hired
with such supplemental funding for an accommodation, and the funding
source terminated payment.
Aside from cost of accommodation, an employer can claim undue hard-
ship if the accommodation would be "unduly disruptive to its other em-
ployees or to the functioning of its business"'1 73 but not if the disruption
is caused by the apprehensions or prejudices of the other employees to
the individual's disability.
174
2. "Job-related" or "Business Necessity" Defense
The general defense provided to employers by the ADA reads:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
Act that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests,
or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or
otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation, as required under this title. 75
It is evident from the legislative history and the regulations that an
employer may use neutral qualification standards, tests or selection cri-
teria, despite any disparate impact on the disabled, if such criteria meas-
ure the ability to perform essential functions of the job. 176 However, even
if the criteria are legitimate, the employer must still determine if rea-
sonable accommodation would allow the disabled individual to perform
adequately. 77 Some policies, such as leave policies or conditions excluded
from employer provided health benefits, which may have a disparate
impact on the disabled, cannot be challenged under the disparate impact
theory as long as the policies are not strategies to evade the purposes of
Title 1.178
171 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1991).
172 Id.
"29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1991).
174 Id.
'75 ADA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
17 H.R. REP. (II) at 76, S. REP. at 40. See discussion of essential functions supra
notes 121-28.
'729 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(b) and (c) (1991).
1729 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5, 1630.15(b) and (c) (1991). The regulations use an
example of a policy of no leave for the first six months of employment as a type
of policy which cannot be challenged because of adverse impact on the disabled.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(b) and (c) (1991). The employer may have to consider
allowing leave during that time period as reasonable accommodation, however.
I.
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3. Safety Defense
A defense which may have a significant impact on persons with mental
illness is the safety defense. The ADA allows exclusion of a disabled
employee who currently poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace.1 79 Originally drafted to include only
employees with contagious disease, the provision containing the safety
defense was amended to encompass all employees who may constitute a
risk. One of the reasons given for this amendment was concern about
"dangerous or unbalanced workers threatening co-workers."18 0 The leg-
islative history and the regulations clearly show that the defense will
not be allowed on the basis of abstract, unsubstantiated fears of potential
dangerous behavior," nor may the employer deny employment when
there is only a slightly increased risk of harm.1 8 2
The term "direct threat" is defined in the ADA as "a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation"' 18 3 and is intended to embrace the full standard set forth
in the Supreme Court's decision in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Ar-
line.' 4 The Arline Court held that in making the determination of
whether an individual with a contagious disease posed a direct threat
the employer must consider the nature of the risk, the severity of the
',9ADA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The statute specifically states that
"[t]he term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace." Id.1 0 H.R. REP. (III) at 92 (dissenting view of Hon. Chuck Douglas).
81 S. REP. at 27; H.R. REP. (II) at 76.
11229 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
-3 ADA § 101(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). Although the ADA refers only to the
health and safety of others, the regulations issued by the EEOC follow those
promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The safety defense can be
raised both in situations where employment of the disabled individual poses a
risk of harm to others or when the employment poses a risk of harm to the disabled
individual himself. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have applied a different standard in each
of these situations. A very stringent standard has been applied by the courts in
the situations where the individual is a threat to himself, because the purpose
of § 504 was to promote independence of the handicapped and prevent such pa-
ternalistic attitudes and stereotypical prejudices. See, e.g., Bentivegna v. Dep't
of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1982) (the risk of future injury must be
examined with special care if the Rehabilitation Act is not to be circumvented
easily; such safety risks must be examined with "strict scrutiny"). When the safety
of others is at issue, the courts have recognized this as a valid concern and have
applied a less strict test in determining if the defense is valid. See, e.g., School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Strathie v. Dep't. of Transp.,
716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). See
generally Tucker, supra note 19, at 897-902.
18 480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); H.R. REP. (II) at 76.
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risk and the likelihood of harm to others.' 0s The risk of harm cannot be
speculative or remote.1 86 In Mantolete v. Bolger,'87 a case involving an
individual disabled by epilepsy, the court used the standard of "a rea-
sonable probability of substantial harm."'1 The determination "must rely
on objective, factual evidence" - not on subjective perceptions, irrational
fears, patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes - about the nature or effect
of a particular disability. 18 9
The employer carries the burden of proof on the issue of safety, and
must identify the specific risk presented by the individual. 90 For indi-
viduals with mental illness, the employer must identify the specific be-
havior that poses the threat. 19 The employer must also prove that
reasonable accommodation would not eliminate the threat, or that such
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.
192
E. Insurance Issues
Health insurance has been developing into an increasingly important
issue for individuals suffering from mental illness because of escalating
cutbacks in mental health benefits and the variance between benefits
provided for physical and mental illnesses. 9 3 Cases brought under the
Rehabilitation Act challenging these discrepancies have consistently held
that employers need not provide coverage for mental illness equivalent
to that provided for physical illness as long as all employees or insureds
are treated equally.19 4 The ADA is to be interpreted consistently with
t85 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. Compare the Supreme Court's standards with those
proposed in Alexander D. Brooks, Defining the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill:
Involuntary Civil Commitment, in MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 280 (Michael Craft
& Ann Craft eds., 1984) (nature, magnitude, imminence, frequency of harm,
likelihood of harm, surrounding circumstances, and balancing the nature of the
alleged harm with the proposed intervention).
186 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
1t8 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
19 Id at 1422.
19 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1991).190 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1991).
191 Id.
t92 Id.
193 Stephan Haimowitz, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Its Signifi-
cance for People With Mental Illness, 42 Hosp. & COMM. PsY. 23 (1991). While
health care costs overall have increased 12% to 20% per year in recent years, a
recent survey of employers with more than 5000 employees by A. Foster Higgins
& Co., Inc. showed an increase in the cost of mental health benefits of 47% in
1989. Linda Williams, Getting Therapy for the High Cost of Mental Health Benefits,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, at D1.
194 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that the state is not
required under the Rehabilitation Act to assure the handicapped adequate health
care by providing them with more coverage than the nonhandicapped); Doe v.
Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that the mentally ill were not a
suspect class and that plaintiff was therefore unlikely to succeed on the merits
of his claim that limitations on state benefits for private psychiatric hospitali-
zation violated the Rehabilitation Act and equal protection); Doe v. Devine, 545
F. Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1982) (federal agency's legitimate interest in reducing pro-
gram costs was sufficient basis for reduction of mental health benefits to its
employees and did not violate the Rehabilitation Act).
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these cases. Employers may limit coverage for or exclude certain condi-
tions, but the limitation or exclusion must apply to all employees with
or without disabilities. 19
Notwithstanding the fact that Title I prohibits discrimination on the
basis of employee benefit plans,' 96 section 501(c) of the ADA allows em-
ployers to continue to provide benefits consistent with their current prac-
tices if: any exclusions or limitations from coverage are based on the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan; the terms are based on underwriting
risks, classifying risks or administering such risks and; the benefit plan
provisions are not used as a subterfuge to evade the provisions of Title I
of the ADA. 197 The purpose of section 501(c) ensure that the ADA will
not disrupt current underwriting practices or the current regulatory
structure for self-insured employers. 9 Employers and insurers are pro-
hibited from denying insurance or providing insurance with different
terms or conditions to an individual with a disability if the disability does
not pose increased risks.199 An employer may not deny a qualified indi-
vidual employment because the employer's current insurance plan does
not include the individual's disability or because of the increased cost of
insurance because of the disability. 200
F. Enforcement and Remedies
The ADA incorporates by reference the powers, procedures and reme-
dial provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.201 The intent
of the legislators was that the enforcement procedures and remedies avail-
able to individuals subjected to disability-based discrimination be the
same as those available to persons discriminated against on the basis of
sex, race, religion or national origin.20 2 By incorporating the provisions
of the Civil Rights Act by reference, the ADA will reflect any future
195 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.5 (1991).
116ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
"I ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
159 S. REP. at 84-85.
199 Id. See also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 507-09 (1991).
"I S. REP. at 85. The Rehabilitation Act fails to specify rules for risk classifi-
cation equivalent to § 501(c) of the ADA. Employers who are also governed by
the Rehabilitation Act apparently will not be able to take advantage of these
special benefit rules. Cheryl D. Fells, Employee Benefit Plan Implications of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIEs ACT (Practising Law Institute 1990).
"o 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8 and 2000e-9 (1982).
22 H.R. REP. (III) at 48-49. Title VII used mainly non-punitive means of rem-
edying employment discrimination. It did not allow for jury trials, and limited
the available remedies to injunctive relief, reinstatement or payment of back
wage. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991),
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amendments to Title VII.203 Under the ADA, a successful plaintiff will
be entitled to injunctive relief, reinstatement, and/or back pay, and, in
cases of intentional discrimination, punitive and compensatory damages
up to certain limits. Attorney's fees and costs may be awarded at the
court's discretion.
20 4
Current Title VII procedures are in two stages. Individuals who claim
that they have been discriminated against must first file a charge with
the state agency having jurisdiction over the claim, and thereafter may
file a claim with the EEOC. The time limitation for filing with the EEOC
is 300 days from the date of the discriminatory action or discharge or
within 30 days of the termination of the state or local proceeding, which-
ever is earlier. 20 5 If no state agency exists which has jurisdiction over the
claim, the charge must be filed directly with the EEOC within 180 days
of the incident.20 6 The EEOC then has 180 days to investigate and either
which was signed by President Bush on November 21, 1991, amended Title VII
and thereby also applies to discrimination under the ADA. The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 authorizes jury trials and, in addition to the back pay and other relief
authorized by § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides for recovery of
compensatory damages for punitive damages and future pecuniary losses, emo-
tional pain and suffering and other nonpecuniary losses in case of intentional
discrimination, except when the employer demonstrates that good faith efforts
were made in consultation with the individual with a disability to identify and
make reasonable accommodation. Id. at § 102(a)(3). The Act also extends that
statute of limitations for filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at
§ 114.
203 H.R. REP. (III) at 48. An attempt to incorporate the actual wording from
Title VII to freeze the remedies available under the ADA was rejected as "an-
tithetical to the purpose of the ADA - to provide civil rights protections for persons
with disabilities that are parallel to those available to minorities and women."Id.
204 ADA § 505, 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Litigation expense is mentioned apart from
costs and is specifically intended to include the costs of experts and the preparation
of exhibits. "Prevailing party" shall be interpreted consistently with other civil
rights laws. Plaintiffs are not to be assessed the attorney's fees of the opponents
unless the court finds that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous. H.R. REP. (II) at
140.
205 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and (e) (1982). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extends
this 30 day limitation to 90 days in actions against the federal government. Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 114 (1991).
206 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). The Supreme Court, in Indep. Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) held that the time limitation on filing
with the EEOC in cases involving private employers is "not a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limi-
tations is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling." Several cases have
addressed whether the existence of a mental disability tolls the 30 day filing
limitation. See, e.g., Kien v. U.S., 749 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C. 1990) (plaintiffs
borderline personality disorder did not prevent him from comprehending his legal
rights and did not equitably toll the time period for appealing EEOC's decision);
McElrath v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1989) (court deemed administrative
complaint constructively filed by chronic alcoholic who was too confused to comply
with the administrative requirements of the Rehabilitation Act).
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seek a conciliation agreement from the employer, to file suit on behalf of
the charging party, 07 or to issue a determination and/or a right to sue
letter which allows the party to file suit individually in federal court
within 90 days from the receipt of the letter.08 EEOC procedures must
be exhausted as a prerequisite to filing suit, as required under Title VII.20
9
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS UNDER TITLE I FOR
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
The general concepts under Title I which have been analyzed create
some special difficulties when applied to employees with mental disabil-
ities. The most significant of such problems are discussed in the following
sections.
A. Knowledge of the Disability
The duty to accommodate arises only in situations where the employer
knows of the existence of the disability, and such accommodation is gen-
erally at the request of the disabled individual.2"0 Persons with mental
illness are hesitant to make their disability known because of the stigma
attached2 'I and are often reluctant to seek help.212 Since mental illness
is a "hidden handicap" which in most cases is not readily detectable by
an employer as are many physical disabilities, and because the act pro-
hibits pre-employment inquiry regarding such disabilities, making a
mental disability known if accommodation is needed becomes an impor-
tant issue for an individual with such a disability. This was demonstrated
in Schmidt v. Bell,2 ' in which the plaintiff, who suffered from both phys-
ical and mental disabilities as a result of his service in Vietnam, was
terminated from his position as a student loan collector in part because
of his difficulty in accepting supervision and his conflicts in dealing with
several clients. 2 14 The employer successfully argued that, although aware
of plaintiff's physical handicap, it was unaware of and thus had no duty
to accommodate plaintiff's mental disability of post-traumatic stress dis-
207 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
-10 Id. § 2000e-5((1).
209 H.R. REP. (III) at 49.
210 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1991). In the absence of such a request, an accom-
modation should not be offered.
211 See generally Freudenheim, supra note 155.
212 Id.; Jan Larson, Treating the Whole Worker at Westinghouse, AMERICAN
DEMOGRAPHICS, June, 1991, at 32 (1988 study of almost 2,000 employees showed
that few people recognized their own mental health problems and even fewer
would seek help).
213 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
214 Id. at 841.
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order.215 A person with mental illness, particularly in its milder forms,
is thus faced with a difficult choice of making their psychiatric condition
public or foregoing the protections of the ADA.
B. Conduct vs. Disability
One of the most difficult aspects of determining the disability of an
individual with mental illness is separating the person's conduct from
their impairment. 216 Unlike an individual with a physical disability which
creates obvious, circumscribed limitations on his abilities, psychiatric
impairments generally manifest themselves in inappropriate behav-
iors.217 It is often difficult to determine with certainty which behaviors
are in fact a manifestation of the mental illness. Only those inappropriate
or abnormal behaviors which result from the mental illness need be rea-
sonably accommodated - therefore it is important to distinguish these
from unrelated behaviors which prohibit satisfactory job performance.
This may be an impossible task, and the courts have reflected this dif-
ficulty in cases brought under § 504,218 finding that dismissal on the basis
of the employee's conduct, even if such conduct resulted from the mental
illness, was justified.21 9
21n Id. at 845-46. The court did not decide the case on this issue, however, since
the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified," even if reasonable accommodation
were provided.
216 ZISKIN & FAUST, supra note 103 states:
Given the general problem of distinguishing or defining normality and
abnormality, it also follows that there will be considerable difficulties mak-
ing these separations for specific forms of thinking or behavior. For example,
it is often uncertain whether a specific behavior represents a 'psychiatric
symptom' as opposed to normal behavior, or behavior seen among normal
individuals.
Id. at 175.
217 "Some of the commonest problems in rehabilitation [of individuals with
mental illness] are concerned with lethargy, and unacceptable behavior, lack of
awareness of handicaps and disturbance in social relationships." BLACK, supra
note 8, at 12 (quoting Royal College of Psychiatrists, Psychiatric Rehabilitation
in the 1980s (1980)).
218 See cases cited infra note 219. See generally Larson, supra note 82.
219 See Wimbly v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (Plaintiff was
discharged due to absenteeism which he claimed was a result of his service-
connected mental disability. The court found that the attendance policy was neu-
tral and that plaintiff failed to prove disparate impact.); Swann v. Walters, 620
F. Supp. 741 (D.D.C. 1984) (The plaintiff was discharged from his employment
because of criminal misconduct - sexual child abuse - despite evidence that this
conduct was a result of his mental disability of paranoid schizophrenia); Guerriero
v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.D.C. 1983) (Foreign service officer suffering
from alcoholism and schizoid personality disorder was dismissed because of sexual
conduct with several prostitutes in a public bar, and evidence indicated that the
court was attributable, at least in part, to his mental illness. The court did not
decide that issue and instead found the plaintiff to be otherwise unqualified
because he needed treatment available only in the United States and his position
required overseas travel); Russell v. Frank, No. 89-2777-Z, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7549, at *10-11 (D. Mass., May 23, 1991) (An employee suffering from paranoid
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If an individual is found to be disabled due to mental illness under the
statute and the problematic conduct of the individual is determined to
be a result of the person's disability, the conduct must again be considered
when making the determination of whether the individual is "qualified,"
and whether reasonable accommodation can be made or undue hardship
exists. At each of these levels, the decision must be made as to what job
behaviors truly impair job performance. One method of making the de-
termination may be to analogize the behavior to physical appearance.
The legislative history indicates that an employer may not exclude an
individual because of adverse reactions of other employees to that person's
physical appearance 220 - likewise, adverse reactions to an individual's
bizarre behavior resulting from a mental disability cannot justify exclu-
sion of that person. Such behaviors should be the basis for exclusion only
when the behaviors actually prevent performance of essential functions
of the job, and reasonable accommodation is not possible.
Another potential issue in distinguishing conduct from a disability, an
issue which will have a particular impact on persons with mental illness,
is the concept of voluntariness, since the aberrant behavior which arises
from the mental illness may be controlled if the person chose to take
medication. 221 In Tudyman v. United Airlines,222 the plaintiff alleged that
his rejection from employment because he did not meet the airline's
weight guidelines was discrimination on the basis of handicap. One of
the reasons the district court found that the applicant's weight was not
a handicap was the fact that it was a voluntarily created condition re-
sulting from his avid body building program.2 3 The court in Franklin v.
United States Postal Service224 distinguished between the plaintiff's
"handicap" of paranoid schizophrenia controllable with medication, and
her "condition" of unmanageable behavior resulting from her voluntary
refusal to take the medication. 225 Stating that her condition "may place
Plaintiff in the handicapped category '"2 26 the court found more important
the fact that her intentional decision not to take her medication caused
her problems on her job. 227
schizophrenia argued that falsification of his medical history during post-offer
medical examination was caused by his handicap. The court held that employers
are not required to suspend requirements of employee honesty to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff - honesty is an essential part of every job.).
220 S. REP. at 7, H.R. REP, (II) at 30. Disruption of the workplace because of
employees' negative reactions to an individual's disability is not an undue hard-
ship under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1991).
221 See generally ESTROFF, supra note 81, at 220-32 (discussing several theories
of the intentional use by mentally ill individuals of "crazy" behaviors in order to
control others or avoid responsibility).
222 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
223 Id.
224 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
212 Id. at 1217.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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C. Confidentiality
The ADA prohibits employers from asking applicants whether they
suffer from a disability or the nature or severity of such disability,228 and
likewise prohibits the same query of persons already employed "unless
such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity."229 Under the ADA the applicant or employee
suffering from a mental illness which is not apparent must provide such
information voluntarily if accommodation is desired. The employer may
not discriminate on the basis of such voluntarily provided information,
and must keep it confidential under the terms of the Act, except that:
(i) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding nec-
essary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee
and necessary accommodations;
(ii) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when ap-
propriate, if the disability might require emergency treat-
ment;
(iii) government officials investigating compliance with this
Act shall be provided relevant information on request[.]230
Providing accommodation in the case of a hidden handicap such as mental
illness while respecting the requirement for confidentiality may lead to
the problem of resentment on the part of other employees who see what
they consider to be preferential treatment of the disabled employee. 23' "If
co-workers feel a disabled individual is not 'pulling his/her load' or is
receiving unfair privileges it may negatively affect morale and lead to
social exclusion of the client."232 A decline in employee morale or destruc-
tion of employees' faith in the fairness of their employer are foreseeable
problems in this situation. A negative impact on employee morale is not,
however, a legitimate claim of undue hardship under the ADA. 23 3 Ori-
enting co-workers and supervisors about the employee's disability is a
no-cost accommodation which would greatly aid in the prevention of ero-
229 ADA § 102(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(A). See discussion of prohibited
actions, supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
229 ADA § 102(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(4)(A).
230 ADA § 102(c)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3)(B).
231 See Paul H. Wehman, The Use of Behavior Modification in Competitive
Employment, in VOCATIONAL EVALUATION, WORK ADJUSTMENT, AND INDEPENDENT
LIVING FOR SEVERELY DISABLED PEOPLE 189-90 (Robert Lassiter, et al. eds., 1983).
232 Id. But see S. REP. 28-29 (study done of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company's experiences with 1,452 physically handicapped employees found that
other employees did not resent necessary accommodations made for the disabled
employees). One author proposes a hypothetical situation in which minority work-
ers bring claims of discriminatory practices when a non-minority worker, whom
they do not know is disabled, is given preferential treatment as part of reasonable
accommodation under the Act. Michael A. Faillace & Howard G. Ziff, Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE
WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 76-77 (Practising Law Institute
1990).
23 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1991).
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sion of morale, but it conflicts with the confidentiality requirements of
the Act.
234
D. Safety and Prediction of Dangerousness
Unfortunately, in our society, abstract unsubstantiated fears of violence
on the part of the mentally ill are widely shared. 235 Mental illness and
dangerous behavior have historically been associated, and the exagger-
ation of the crime rates of the mentally ill in the media perpetuates that
belief today.236 The growing body of empirical research on the relationship
between violence and mental illness disproves this mythology, however.
237
As the President's Commission on Mental Health 23 8 found:
The sporadic violence of so-called "mentally ill killers" as de-
picted in stories and dramas is more a device of fiction than a
fact of life. Patients with serious psychological disorders are
more likely to be withdrawn, apathetic, and fearful. We do not
deny that some mentally ill people are violent, but the image
of the mentally ill person as essentially a violent person is
erroneous.
239
In addition to the problem of stereotypical fears and prejudices con-
cerning the dangerousness of the mentally ill, mental health professionals
encounter great difficulty in accurately predicting dangerous behavior.240
Studies have also found that the psychiatric disorders of sociopathy, al-
coholism and drug dependence are the impairments characteristically
associated with serious crime; it is significant that the ADA limits the
24 Collignon, supra note 152, at 223 (orienting co-workers and supervisors
about the employee's mental illness was used as an accommodation for 47.4% of
the employees with mental disability).
• 3See Trute et al. supra note 6, at 69; Melton & Garrison, supra note 6 at
1007.
This type of attitude is exemplified by the letter sent by Rep. Chuck Douglas
to all members of the House of Representatives in March, 1990. The letter con-
tained a drawing of a man with a rifle captioned "Berserkers: Time Bombs in the
Workplace. How can we protect ourselves from a growing menace?" The letter,
which also included a copy of a newspaper article about a mentally ill Kentucky
man who killed seven employees at his previous place of employment, went on
to warn that the ADA, if passed, would force employers to hire such dangerous
individuals. Laura A. Kiernan, Alliance Irked at Jacobs Letter, BOSTON GLOBE,
April 8, 1990, at 2.
236 JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 77 (1981).
237 Id. at 77-82 (mental illnesses such as psychosis, schizophrenia, primary
affective disorders, and neurotic disorders carry only a slightly increased risk of
criminality and several studies indicate that there is not an increased rate of
mental illness among prisoners). See also STEVEN R. SMITH & ROBERT G. MEYER,
LAW, BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL HEALTH POLICY AND PRACTICE 602 n.54 (1987).
23 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH 56 (1978).
239 Id.
240 See MONAHAN, supra note 236; Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and
Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence From the Epidemiologic Cach-
ment Area Surveys, 41 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990).
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extent to which employers must accommodate individuals with drug de-
pendence or alcoholism. 241
Several cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act address the safety
defense in situations where the employee was mentally ill. In Doe v.
Region 13 Mental Health- Mental Retardation Commission242 the plaintiff,
a psychiatric social worker, was dismissed because of psychiatric prob-
lems. The plaintiff, although a superior employee, was suicidal at times
and all of the physicians who testified about her condition felt that her
bias towards suicide might be passed along to her patients.243 The court
found the totality of the evidence in support of the employer to be over-
whelming and stated:
We believe in cases of this sort where, as here, there has been
no showing of discriminatory animus, and where there is un-
controverted evidence of a chronic, deteriorating situation
which is reasonably interpreted to pose a threat to the patients
with whom the employee must work, no violation of section
504 could reasonably be found. 244
The court in Doe v. New York University245 held that the medical school
could consider the plaintiffs handicap of mental illness in determining
if she was less qualified than another applicant if she presented "any
appreciable risk" of harm to herself or others. 246 The plaintiff had pre-
viously exhibited self destructive and anti-social behavior and had been
diagnosed as suffering from borderline personality disorder which was
likely to continue throughout her adult life. 247 The "any appreciable risk"
standard established by the Doe court is a fairly minimal burden on the
employer and is unlikely to stand up under the ADA. 248
Potential harm to the mentally disabled employee himself takes on
greater significance to employers as worker's compensation claims for
mental injuries such as anxiety disorder and stress-related illness caused
by employment increase.249 An employer may not base its determination
24,1 Testing for illegal drug use is allowed under the ADA, and current drug
users are not considered disabled under the Act by virtue of such drug use. ADA
§ 510, 42 U.S.C. § 12210.
242 704 F.2d 1402, reh'g denied, 709 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1983).
241 Id. at 1409.
2
44 Id. at 1412.
245 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
246 Id. at 777.
247 Id. at 766-68.
248 See also Maffeo, supra note 137, at 311-12 (although published norms and
clinical experience can be used to predict recurrence of conditions, use of base
rates alone is not a sufficiently individualized evaluation of risk).
249 All but ten states now recognize emotional or mental injury as compensable
occupational injury, without requiring an antecedent physical injury. See Joseph
Mangan, Underwriting Update - Stress-Related Claims: Causes and Controls, in
BEsT'S REVIEW - PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION, Mar. 1991, at 68. See
also Janet M. Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the
Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under Fed-
eral and State Employment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 659, 711-18 (1979).
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of likelihood of emotional or psychological injury to the applicant on the
applicant's prior worker's compensation claims. 2 ° Though numerous em-
ployers have argued that investigation into an applicant's worker's com-
pensation history is job related and consistent with business necessity,25'
such investigation is not a permissible pre-employment inquiry under
the regulations.
2 52
V. CONCLUSION
The growth of civil rights for the disabled in recent years has focused
on the problems of physical disabilities and removal of architectural bar-
riers. Notable gains have been made in society's recognition of the rights
and needs of such individuals, but acknowledgement of the less obvious
condition of psychiatric disability has lagged far behind.253 The expansion
of employment rights to the mentally ill afforded by the ADA is a logical
extension of the recent movement towards community-focused mental
health services. The psychiatrically disabled individuals being main-
tained in the community deserve full participation in the life of the com-
munity, including employment. Moreover, employment has been found
by numerous researchers to have therapeutic value for the mentally ill.
254
"[T]he ex-mental patient who, based on unfounded bias and stigma, is
prevented from returning to employment commensurate with his skills,
interests, and abilities is in effect being deprived of the opportunity to
fully restore his mental health. '25 5 A study of recently hospitalized persons
with mental illness 256 found that the feature of community living which
emerged as the major problem for these individuals was that of finding
employment.25 7 Of the group, sixty-nine percent felt they were capable of
being competitively employed 258 and forty-five percent of the group re-
25 See supra notes 179 and 183.
251 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,728 (1991).
252 9 C.F.R. app. § 1630.13(a) (1991).
253 Community mental health centers placed vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices low on the list of those they believed their patients had to have .... It
is a measure of how low rehabilitation of the mentally ill had fallen that
in 1983 the U.S. Department of Education omitted rehabilitation of the
mentally ill from its priority list for its National Institute of Handicapped
Research. It took strong protests to have it reinstated the following year.
BLACK, supra note 8, at 11. Sheltered workshops for the disabled have long resisted
serving the mentally ill along with their other clients. Id. at 18.
254 For a comprehensive survey of literature on the value of work to the mentally
ill, see BLACK, supra note 8, at 1-19.
251 Id. at 15 (quoting George Howard, The Ex-Mental Patient as an Employee:
An on-the-Job Evaluation, 45 AM. J. ORTHPSYCH. 479-83 (1975)).
256 See PHYLLIA L. SOLOMON ET AL., COMMUNITY SERVICES TO DISCHARGED PSY-
CHIATRIC PATIENTS (1984).
257 Id. at 144.
25 Although the interviewees' self-assessments were generally more positive
than social worker assessments, there were indications that their appraisals on
employability were accurate. Id. at 146.
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ported difficulties obtaining employment. The study further found that
inability to find work was the single largest obstacle to making a suc-
cessful transition into the community - only ten percent of the group were
employed one year after discharge.
259
The prohibition against discrimination on the basis of current mental
illness and psychiatric history may well be the most important provision
of the ADA for individuals with psychiatric problems. Such individuals
have historically had greater difficulties obtaining employment in the
first place than retaining ajob once employed.26° By preventing employers
from asking about prior psychiatric treatment or mental illness, Title I
should effectively preclude negative societal attitudes and prejudices from
playing a part in employment decisions, and thereby should enhance the
ability of such individuals to obtain employment.
When individuals with mental disabilities are successfully placed in
employment, continuing care is essential for maintaining the stability of
most such employees.261 Researchers have found that, when properly
placed and provided access to appropriate follow-up treatment, many
mentally disabled employees perform better than average employees.2 62
Unfortunately, the development of community-based mental health serv-
ices has lagged far behind the deinstitutionalization movement, often
making needed mental health services difficult to obtain.2 62 Coincidental
with the rapid growth in demand for community services has been the
repeated cutbacks in mental health insurance benefits by many employ-
ers. 2- ADA will have little effect on the psychiatrically disabled who are
unable to access the services which they need in order to function at a
level which allows them to work.
Many commentators feel that the major effort in maintaining the re-
habilitation of the mentally ill in the future lies in the workplace.26 5 The
rapid growth of employee assistance programs (EAPs) over the past dec-
ade, although developed primarily to attend to the problems of substance
abuse, demonstrates the benefits to both employers and their employees
when the employer assumes some responsibility for maintaining the men-
259 Id.
260 BLACK, supra note 8, at 194; STANFORD E. RUBIN & RICHARD T. ROESSLER,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROCESS 133 (3rd ed. 1987).
-1 Bacani-Oropilla et al., supra note 81, at 326.
262 See generally NAT'L INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES PUB. No. (ADM) 81-1072, EIGHT QUESTIONS EMPLOYERS
ASK ABOUT HIRING THE MENTALLY RESTORED (1981).
26 See BLACK, supra note 8, at 10-11; JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 215-34; IsAAc
& ARMAT, supra note 10, at 86-106.
264 Cindy Skrzycki, Seeking Cures for Costs of Mental Health: Employers Clamp
Down on Inpatient Treatment, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1991, at El; Timothy H.
Willard, Looking Ahead/The Rising Costs of Mental Health Care, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1990, at D3.
265 BLACK, supra note 8, at 219.
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tal health of employees.2 66 These programs maintain and improve the
health, safety and productivity of the workforce, and at the same time
cut costs to employers by recognizing and providing early attention to
emotional and psychological problems. 2 67 While the duty to accommodate
mentally disabled employees imposed by the ADA will not require that
every employer provide psychological counseling, employers who offer
the benefits of an employee assistance program will likely be found to
have met the requirement of reasonable accommodation.
Another provision of the ADA which will have significant impact on
the psychiatrically disabled is its requirement for individualized deter-
mination.2 6 The controversy regarding reliability and validity of psy-
chiatric diagnoses,269 and the frequent lack of correlation between an
individual's diagnosis and capacity to work 270 reinforces the need for such
a determination. The presence or absence of physical, intellectual and
emotional skills, and the specific demands of the work setting, not psy-
chiatric diagnosis, predict the ability of an individual's success at work.
All of these elements must be analyzed to determine if the individual is
a qualified person with a disability and whether the disability can be
accommodated. Likewise, judgments about risk of danger posed by an
individual with mental illness must also be made only after careful con-
sideration of individual factors such as current condition, history, length
of time elapsed since the last occurrence, prior precipitating factors, like-
lihood of encountering similar precipitating factors in current employ-
ment, and success of treatment, rather than on general statements about
the prognosis of persons with a particular diagnosis.
271
Expanded employment opportunities for the mentally ill under the
ADA will force employers and other employees to become more aware of
the needs of people with mental or emotional illness in the workplace
and to develop constructive methods of dealing with such employees.
Clearly, the ADA, in its attempt to balance the rights of disabled with
the fiscal needs of employers, provides a framework to eliminate much
161 Growth of EAPs has skyrocketed during the 1980's. In 1987, 80% of the
Fortune 500 companies had EAPs. These firms are trying to help troubled em-
ployees regain their health and productivity rather than fire or discipline such
employees, as the EAPs broaden their scope to include emotional and mental
problems in addition to alcoholism and drug abuse. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAMS: BENEFITS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1-5 (BNA 1987).
16, Id. at 150-51. See also John Nordheimer, Ideas & Trends: Psychological
Counseling from the Company Store, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, § 4, at 5 (com-
panies who sponsor EAPs can expect a five to one return on their investment
when a worker responds to counseling and job performance improves).
268 See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
278 RUBIN & ROESSLER, supra note 260, at 133 (citing HYMAN J. WEINER ET AL.,
MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE WORLD OF WORK 123 (1973)).
271 See Maffeo, supra note 137, at 312-15.
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of the invidious discrimination against the psychiatrically disabled in the
employment arena. The courts, the legislature, the mental health system
and private employers must work together to ensure effective compliance
with and enforcement of the Act.
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